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3INTRODUCTION 
This is the 14th report produced by the Independent 
Monitoring Board (IMB) of the Global Polio Eradication 
Initiative (GPEI). Since our last report, the membership 
of the Board has been streamlined and reconstituted 
to respond to the establishment of a polio Transition 
Independent Monitoring Board (TIMB). In the absence of a 
separate monitoring function for the transition and legacy 
work of the GPEI, in its previous reports, the IMB had 
commented periodically on transition planning matters.  
The reconstituted IMB will now focus exclusively on 
objective one of the GPEI strategic plan 2013-2018: “Stop 
all wild poliovirus transmission by the end of 2014 and 
new vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks within 120 days 
of confirmation of the first case.” This objective became 
modified as a result of the Polio Oversight Board’s decision 
to choose a most likely scenario based on modelling to 
support work on financing the Polio Programme. From 
a range of dates for interrupting transmission globally, 
and in the individual endemic countries, four scenarios 
were constructed, ranging from “optimistic” through 
“intermediate” to “pessimistic.” The Board chose an 
“intermediate” scenario, where global transmission would 
be interrupted by 2016. In the “pessimistic” scenario this 
date was the end of 2017.
The 13th IMB Report was published in August 2016. 
It assessed progress on objective one (modified) and 
therefore looked towards the Polio Programme’s deadline 
of interrupting poliovirus transmission globally by the end 
of December 2016. The GPEI had asked that there should 
be no IMB meeting in the autumn of 2016. This was to 
enable total programmatic focus on achieving the end of 
year goal. This, the 14th IMB report, follows the Board’s May 
2017 meeting, in London, with GPEI staff, donors, extended 
partners, and health ministers of the three polio endemic 
countries.
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The IMB continues to be deeply impressed with the overall 
commitment, dedication, and courage of frontline staff 
and their leaders in each of the three endemic countries. 
Many crucial areas of these countries are beset by 
insecurity, danger, and complexity on a scale that is truly 
extraordinary in the delivery of public health programmes. 
Based on data up to 31st May 2017, the high-level features 
of progress since our last report are:
• The end of December 2016 deadline for interrupting 
poliovirus transmission globally was not achieved.
• Nigeria has been re-designated as a polio-endemic 
country, only one year after being declared free of 
poliovirus.
• The discovery of a wild poliovirus that had been 
circulating in Borno State for five years undetected casts 
serious doubts on whether polio has been eliminated 
from all parts of Africa. 
• The presence of the poliovirus in Borno immediately 
raises the strong possibility that there is circulating 
poliovirus in the countries surrounding Northern Nigeria- 
Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, and Cameroon.
• The most recent case of wild poliovirus in Pakistan was 
on 13th February 2017 but virus-positive environmental 
samples are still being found in all three of the major 
polio reservoirs.
• The most recent case of wild poliovirus in Afghanistan 
was on 21st February 2017.
• All cases of wild poliovirus in Afghanistan since April 
2016 were new introductions; there has been no renewed 
circulation.
• Cases of wild poliovirus associated with paralysis in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2017 have been halved 
compared to the same period a year ago, with cases in 
fewer districts and less viral diversity. 
• There have been no cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus 
detected in the endemic countries during 2017, but two 
outbreaks of circulating vaccine derived poliovirus type 
2 (cVDPV2) occurred in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.
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Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to be regarded by 
the Polio Programme as one epidemiological block, with 
poliovirus reservoirs that span the two countries. This is 
the correct perspective but each country’s programme also 
has its own distinctive features. 
In reviewing Pakistan, the IMB has gained the strong 
impression of a high-performing programme. The Polio 
Programme in Pakistan is continuing to benefit from 
exceptional political leadership, skill and commitment on 
the part of the Health Minister, the Prime Minister’s Focal 
Person on Polio Eradication, and the Provincial Secretaries.
An important and recent innovation in programme 
governance has been the engagement of the divisional 
level – below that of the province. Over the last year, this 
has substantially improved. Divisional level taskforces run 
by divisional commissioners are in operation. Since January 
2017, in the run-up to the election, more of these people 
have been moved around. The Health Minister of Pakistan 
strongly reassured the IMB that the Polio Programme 
would not suffer as a result of pre-, and post-electoral 
changes of leadership and personnel. However, it is 
absolutely vital that Polio Programme governance remains 
stable preceding and following a major election. This means 
attending to detail: how to make sure that incoming officials 
are briefed, that they are mentored in their complex new 
jobs, and that they are able to seamlessly pick up the polio 
baton at a crucial time for Pakistan.
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The impression of strong programme performance seems 
to be backed up by data. Pakistan has had two cases of 
paralytic polio associated with wild poliovirus in 2017. Both 
were outside the endemic reservoirs. The cases have been 
subject to very aggressive response. However, there are 
still extensive environmental positive samples in the Quetta 
Block and Killa Abdullah. In several locations, this has been 
happening consistently for the past two years – for example 
in Shaheen Town, Peshawar, and in Surpal, Quetta. There 
are also recurrent positives in Karachi. However, it has to 
be said that the current scale of environmental sampling is 
unprecedented. There are now 53 active surveillance sites 
in Pakistan. This provides a higher resolution focus on virus 
circulation than ever before. India only began environmental 
sampling at the very end of its eradication effort. In India, 
the environment continued to be poliovirus-positive for 
several months after the last case. There can be no 
room for complacency about the positive environmental 
samples in Pakistan but, two years ago, the presence of 
these samples would have sparked cases of paralytic 
polio. They have not this time around, at least as has been 
identified so far. 
Sero-prevalence data are the ultimate arbiter of protection. 
Results of studies since the last IMB report show high 
levels of population protection in the parts of every province 
tested, except for Quetta Block. Here immunity is too low. 
Experience from India is that multiple doses of vaccine 
(seven or more) are needed in high population density 
areas, and experience from Pakistan and Nigeria suggests 
that inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) can have an important 
role boosting immunity in these locations.
In the Quetta Block, the quality of the programme is still 
well below peak performance. It contains the highest 
number of susceptible children. The Pakistan Polio 
Programme seems to be having the greatest struggle in the 
Quetta Block. There are many reasons for this. For example: 
it is hard to get female community workers, and when 
they are appointed, there is high turnover; there is a high 
number of refusals; there is constant large-scale population 
movement; Baluchistan, as a whole, gets least resources 
and has weaker public services; the extra workload from 
the introduction of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) is taking 
its toll; a rather conservative culture prevails making 
transformative change very difficult to achieve.
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Taking an overview of the polio work in Pakistan, a striking 
observation is the number of children still missed during 
immunisation rounds. Particularly, large numbers are 
missed even after subsequent catch-up activities have 
been completed. This must become a key metric in the 
fight against polio. Looking at the Polio Programme’s 
performance in the last three seasons (covering 15 
immunisation rounds) is revealing. In Pakistan, even after 
attempts to go back to communities to find the children who 
had been missed, the approximate numbers unvaccinated 
were: 767,000 (low season 2016); 760,000 (high season 
2016); 858,000 (low season 2017). 
Fortunately, these represent very small percentages of 
the huge numbers of children successfully vaccinated 
in Pakistan in recent times. However, at this stage of the 
eradication effort, the absolute numbers, particularly when 
clustered in communities, are much more important than 
the percentages. In such large populations of vulnerable 
children, polioviruses have a much higher chance of 
survival. It is of concern that the highest number of “still 
missed” children is in the Tier 1 (i.e. highest risk districts).
The Polio Programme now looks in detail at the data 
returned from immunisation rounds as: “Child not 
available.” Distinctions are made between children who, at 
the time of the vaccinators’ visit, were not available because 
either they were at school in the immediate locality (NA1), 
or in the wider district (NA2), or much further afield (NA3). 
There are three practical implications of these data. Firstly, 
the numbers are currently too large to give complete 
confidence that poliovirus transmission will be stopped. 
Secondly, the first two groups of “not available” children can 
be reached if good and trusted local knowledge is used to 
identify a “return time” for the child. A visit by a vaccinator 
can then coincide with the child’s availability. Thirdly, the 
large number of children who are far afield in another part 
of Pakistan or Afghanistan represent the greatest challenge 
today and it is a problem crying out for innovative solutions.
We return to the strategic and operational implications of 
population movement in the conclusions of this report.
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The Polio Programme in Afghanistan continues to operate 
with areas of high insecurity. An Emergency Operations 
Centre (EOC) is now firmly established and is leading 
delivery. Surveillance and immunisation performance is 
getting better, but gaps remain. 
The recent improvement in access, particularly in Kunduz, 
is positive, as is the fall in numbers of inaccessible children: 
from 300,000 to less than 100,000. The security situation 
remains fragile and uncertain, and the Polio Programme 
in Afghanistan must be able to take advantage of every 
window of accessibility.
Surveillance indicators for the country look positive. 
However, there remains a risk of localised poor 
performance being masked by good performance in nearby 
areas– notably in Kandahar, Jawzjan and Badakhshan, 
where “silent” districts are a cause for concern. Expansion 
of environmental sampling to new areas - particularly 
Kunduz – may be an important new resource. However, 
the continued absence of environmental sampling in 
Sheegal and Patika is an adverse feature of the surveillance 
programme. Admittedly, the logistics of sampling is difficult 
there but it argues for more innovation.
The overall picture of immunisation activity in Afghanistan 
suggests a progressive and incremental performance 
improvement. The Immunisation Communication Network 
is also being effective in reaching those children missed 
initially in campaigns – with demonstrable success in 
Helmand, Kandahar and Kabul. 
Cross border working has been a historical weakness of 
the programme. The IMB has heard evidence that this has 
improved, with a genuine desire from the staff on both 
sides to work across this divide. Collaboration mechanisms 
have been established and are working. The occurrence 
of regular national programme coordination meetings is a 
good sign. Information is flowing between teams. Now is the 
time to capitalise on this collegiality, and move to a stronger 
system of accountability, with clearer measures of the 
quality of cross-border working. 
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The last time the IMB met, Nigeria had just been declared 
a polio-free country, and removed from the endemic 
list. The emergence of four new cases of polio shortly 
afterwards was an unwelcome turn of events. The source 
of the outbreak was a poliovirus that had been circulating 
unnoticed in Borno State for five years. The perspective 
of the IMB is that neither the Nigeria Polio Programme, 
nor the broader GPEI, have internalised the key lesson 
of Borno: there are blind spots in Nigeria, the Lake Chad 
Region, and elsewhere in Africa where the poliovirus may 
be lurking, undetected.  This represents a major threat to 
global eradication.
The response to the outbreak was strong, but was still 
constrained by high levels of inaccessibility.  The GPEI has 
described the population as being “trapped.” The numbers 
affected are estimated as between three and five million. 
Military action is freeing some of this number but dealing 
effectively with security and access remain central to 
building resilience against renewed poliovirus circulation 
in Nigeria. New approaches to reaching these communities 
are needed. One IMB source has described travelling 
down a road in an endemic area and counting 15 military 
checkpoints, but seeing no vaccination stations.  Being 
unable to reach nearly half the population of the area is a 
crucial barrier to ending the outbreak and to documenting 
that it has been stopped.
Active political commitment to the programme in Nigeria 
appears to have waned somewhat over the last couple of 
years, perhaps with the perception that polio had gone. The 
IMB has observed that, flushed with the success of not seeing 
a poliovirus for some time, the focus of the Polio Programme 
in Nigeria may have turned too swiftly toward polio transition 
leadership, at the expense of continuing the work to ensure 
safe passage to certification of eradication. The last IMB 
report highlighted the need to adopt a resilience mind-set in 
the Nigerian programme. The Nigeria Polio Programme must 
become obsessive in trying to find every last weakness in its 
defenses that could let polio back in. 
The President of Nigeria had agreed, in January 2016, to 
reconstitute an expanded Presidential Task Force on Polio, 
to include the 36 state governors. The engagement of 
Governors and, through them, the Local Government Area 
chairmen, had originally been secured in a meeting with 
Mr. Bill Gates in 2009. It had been further cemented at the 
time of the formal Abuja Commitment of Nigeria’s state 
Governors in 2011. The attendant establishment of polio 
leadership awards by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
at that time also reinforced the political commitment to 
polio eradication. A further move was made to rejuvenate 
the Abuja Commitment when the President and State 
Governors made another public declaration in January 
2016. However, the Presidential Task Force on Polio has not 
been meeting regularly since then.
At first glance, the surveillance data for North East 
Nigeria over the last year has looked very reassuring. 
However, the recent surveillance review conducted by the 
Polio Programme has identified systemic problems with 
the national surveillance system. This requires further 
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investigation, and potentially strong remedial action.  
Suspicious patterns of reporting suggest falsification of 
results. There are reports, too, that surveillance officers in 
some of the southern states are not being paid. There are 
continuing concerns that independent monitoring here may 
be being tampered with. It is not clear what is being done to 
ensure that there is independent verification of accuracy of 
surveillance data. 
Concerns about a further circulating poliovirus discovery are 
not restricted to Nigeria. The complex politics and geography 
of the region around Lake Chad presents profound 
challenges. Several countries’ borders come together at 
this point, with unpredictable population flows, limited 
government services, and limited government health capacity 
across them. Those familiar with the region have observed: 
“There really are no borders.” Islands in Lake Chad are 
hard to reach. Recent conflict in Northern Nigeria between 
the Nigerian military and Boko Haram, has led to massive 
population displacement - an estimated 2.5 million people 
moving from their homes - many either into temporary 
camps in Nigeria or over borders into Niger, Cameroon, or 
Chad. This humanitarian crisis, putting the Lake Chad region 
in flux, has the typical ingredients of violence, infectious 
disease transmission, poor sanitation, and under-nutrition. 
It adds a further dimension to the risks of polio resurging in 
the region. The Polio Programme does not have sufficient 
information on what is happening. Whilst immunisation 
activity took place in all the countries surrounding Nigeria 
after the recent outbreak, the situation needs to be looked 
at afresh. There were already reports of surveillance getting 
scaled back in other parts of Africa because of the process of 
polio transition. This might be justifiable if surveillance were 
of high quality, but often it is not. 
The level of risk and importance needs to be felt at 
the highest levels of government in these surrounding 
states, and the programme needs to take exceptional 
steps to ensure that this happens, including direct senior 
representation to heads of state and through the African 
Union.    
At this point, the IMB judges that the wider lessons from 
the Borno outbreak have not been sufficiently internalised 
by the Polio Programme, both in the country and by GPEI 
leadership. 
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The number of cases of wild poliovirus in 2017 so far (by 
31st May 2017) stands at five. This compares with 16 by the 
same time in 2016, and again reaches the lowest tally since 
records began. That it is more than 60 days since the last 
case of paralytic polio due to wild poliovirus anywhere in 
the world is another first for the GPEI. The genetic diversity 
of the polioviruses tested has also reached an all-time low. 
This suggests a drift towards species extinction. 
These are positive signs but they are not enough for the 
IMB nor the Polio Programme to be sure that the last 
transmission of poliovirus in the world will happen in 
2017. As described earlier in this Report, this was the 
“pessimistic” date for eradication but now it appears 
to be optimistic. More work is needed. Even after the 
last apparent case in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the two 
countries will have to sort out the remaining imperfections 
in their programmes if they are to build resilience. The 
lessons from Nigeria must be taken to heart if the spectacle 
of countries yoyo-ing between endemic and non-endemic 
status is to be avoided.
The right blend of optimism and realism
The number of polio cases confirmed is one proxy for the 
true figure of wild poliovirus infections actually occurring. 
Textbook accounts suggest that there are 200 infections for 
every symptomatic case of polio. Modern thinking is that, 
in an environment of high immunisation rates, the figure 
might be 1000 or even higher. It is important that this is built 
into the thinking of those leading the Polio Programme and 
is used extensively in communications with team leaders 
and staff at the operational level. The difference between 
the identified infections and the hidden infections is not an 
esoteric distinction. It is of essential importance to eradicating 
the disease. Sometimes environmental positives are thought 
of as “not real polio” or somehow reflecting circulation 
within the environment - rather than as a signal of ongoing 
transmission between people, albeit without paralysis.
Over the last two years, the GPEI’s communications have 
repeatedly emphasized “the lowest number of cases 
in history.” There is a danger of enabling a widespread 
belief that these low numbers are all that is left of polio. 
For example, the scale of endeavour and commitment 
necessary to finish the job by wiping out the virus 
circulation associated with the 37 cases of paralytic polio 
in 2016 is very different from stopping 37,000 infections. 
Multiplying the number of detected cases by a thousand is 
a more realistic way of pitching programmes and plans and 
this should be the mindset and the communication tone that 
drives the Polio Programme’s work for the rest of this year.
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The need for a transformative solution
The Polio Program in Pakistan is doing what it has been 
built to do: reaching large numbers of missed children, 
closing immunity gaps, strengthening surveillance systems. 
It is delivering its programme near to peak performance. But 
it is not there yet. Another big step is needed to reach the 
pinnacle at which polio transmission is stopped for good. It is 
vital that the commitment of national government, provincial 
government, and district officials remains at its current level: 
high-energy, laser-focused, and uncompromising in its goal. 
Victory is in Pakistan’s own hands. 
The numbers of children missed in polio vaccination rounds 
remains too high for comfort. If it does not initiate a new 
transmission immediately, it could emerge as an unwelcome 
outbreak on the path to eradication. The single biggest 
issue confronting the Polio Programme in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan is how to effectively reach the large numbers of 
children who are on the move with their families.
The solution to this problem has a number of aspects. 
Firstly, there is a large group of children who are 
temporarily absent from their home when the immunisation 
team visits. They may be simply at school or away for a 
few days or weeks – say, at a wedding elsewhere in the 
union council area or the district. Follow-up visits are still 
not finding enough of such children. It is essential that 
good local knowledge be accessed to enable a visit to be 
precisely matched to child’s return to their home. This 
granularity of information and understanding is essential. It 
means involving local people, taking an enhanced approach 
to microplanning, and establishing flexible arrangements 
for visits. This is already happening with the best polio 
teams, but best practice is not being systematically 
applied everywhere, nor is it sufficiently visible in the Polio 
Programme. It needs to be stated clearly and all teams 
aligned to perform in this way. 
Secondly, there are known nomadic groups. It is essential 
that the Polio Programme continue to reach them. Some of 
their movement patterns are consistent but not completely 
predictable. The use of health camps, providing a range 
of public health services, has been shown to be a good 
way of engaging them. It is important that this approach is 
extended.
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Thirdly, the greatest conundrum is how to reach the much 
larger numbers of mobile children who are not part of 
nomadic communities. The Polio Programme calls these 
children: “Guests.” This term signifies that they travel 
with their own family regularly from one dwelling to 
another staying with wider family or friends for variable 
periods of time. They make up some 90% of what the 
Polio Programme has been calling the “high-risk mobile 
populations” of children. In essence, their pattern of 
residence is distributed. Long distances are travelled 
between bases. There are often intricate social connections 
between sub-populations so that unimmunised children can 
cluster in a densely populated area. The poorest of the poor 
are contained within these mobile populations. The risks of 
poliovirus spread are high.
A major breakthrough is needed to address the problem 
that mass population mobility causes for the Polio 
Programme. Of course, part of the solution is the long 
established practice of vaccinating children at transit points 
and crossings. This is particularly important in places 
where large numbers of people flow through. However, this 
approach, whilst necessary and important, is not sufficient 
to produce major transformational change. It will not 
vaccinate hundreds of thousands of children for the number 
of times required to sustain adequate immunity levels. 
The best performing polio teams are innovating by 
“reframing” the problem of how to reach children in 
mobile families. Instead of defining the problem as how 
to find children while they are on the move, the problem 
is defined as how to organise immunisation to reach 
children where they leave from and where they land, even 
if that “landing” is only a temporary stay of a few days 
in a relative’s house. This is not as easy as it sounds. It 
requires a different and much more flexible approach to 
the process of microplanning, immunisation activities, 
and the leadership of teams. In short, actions tailored to 
reach the large and highly mobile population of children 
moving with their families across Pakistan, into Afghanistan, 
and back again, has to be completely integrated into 
all aspects of the performance of the Polio Programme 
at local level. It also requires accessing detailed local 
knowledge, soft intelligence and in-depth social data 
and support from communities. If the right data are not 
available, they must be collected. If there is no one to 
produce clear incisive analyses of the data, then the country 
programmes should seek the help of the GPEI globally to 
boost analytical capacity. And it requires finding new and 
imaginative solutions devised by local people, so-called 
“microinnovation.” This fundamentally different approach 
is happening in some places but it has to be strategically 
scaled up by the leadership of the GPEI. The gold standard 
is that every child should be on someone’s microplan.  For 
these programmes to reach the travelling communities, 
it will be critical, wherever possible, to enlist community 
leaders and prominent individuals and organisations in the 
immunisation effort.
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The IMB has reviewed information gathered by the Polio 
Programme from recent cases of paralytic polio and positive 
environmental samples. The purpose of so doing was to 
gain insight from the granularity of the findings into the 
systemic nature of operational problems. The investigation 
of such events appears to be very thorough and detailed. 
The documentation generated is very extensive and often 
runs to 30 pages. However, the weaknesses in programme 
performance revealed from the case investigation seem 
quite striking; they show situations when the very basics are 
not being delivered well. 
One case of paralytic polio in Paktika Province, southeastern 
Afghanistan illustrates these bigger points. The report of 
an investigation of the case overseen by the National Rapid 
Response Team inter alia made the following judgements:
• Child had received no doses of oral polio vaccine either 
in routine immunisation or campaigns.
• The coordination mechanism between the polio team, 
partners, and the NGO for both campaign management 
and routine immunisation is weak.
• Basic Package of Health Services implementing-NGO is 
not fully engaged in the polio programme. 
• No evidence to suggest that provincial pre-campaign 
coordination had ever been conducted.
• The quality of AFP visits was “not up to the mark.”
• A displaced population camp had not been included in 
the microplan and missed for two years.
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There are those who will say that cases, looked at in this 
detail, will inevitably reveal such findings. However, this is 
to become inured to the performance weaknesses that it 
points to.
In its last report, the IMB recommended that the role of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in polio eradication 
in Afghanistan should be strengthened. We returned to the 
subject in our recent meeting with the GPEI, with the polio 
donors and extended partners, and with the Afghanistan 
Minister of Health. We encountered a degree of “push 
back” from the Polio Programme in Afghanistan, with a 
clear view that no further action is required. However, 
nearly all of the primary healthcare services, including 
routine immunisation, in Afghanistan are provided by a 
designated NGO, usually a local one, for each province. 
They are given funds to provide these services through 
the World Bank to which various donors contribute.  The 
NGOs are not heavily involved in the Polio Programme in 
the country. The WHO and UNICEF largely deliver this as 
a parallel vertical programme.  It is still the IMB view that 
the Afghanistan-based NGOs could be more engaged in 
microplanning and immunisation rounds.  In order to best 
integrate them into the Polio Programme, in addition to 
the NGO’s nominee being represented on the national and 
provincial Emergency Operations Centres, there would be 
benefit in appointing a full-time designated NGO coordinator 
for polio eradication in Afghanistan. In addition, the IMB 
is disappointed that the Afghanistan Polio Programme 
could not make progress on extending the role of female 
vaccinators, given that this policy has been so successful 
in Pakistan. The IMB also remains concerned about 
lack of data on performance in areas controlled by non-
government entities.
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The poor state of routine immunisation in the Pakistan and 
Afghanistan polio reservoirs
A seasoned observer of public health services in Pakistan 
told the IMB: “If the country had even a half-competent 
routine immunisation programme in its reservoirs, polio 
would be long gone.”
The reality is that, despite some recent improvements, 
key areas of Pakistan have some of the worst levels 
of routine vaccine coverage in the world. Most of the 
terms converted to acronyms and used by staff in the 
Polio Programme and the wider public health world are 
seldom spoken in full. An example is the acronym “SIA.” 
This stands for: “Supplementary Immunisation Activities.” 
This is the mainstay of the Polio Programme. SIAs cost 
hundreds of million dollars a year. No one ever thinks 
about the meaning of the words any more. Yet, the word 
“Supplementary” is there for a reason. It is meant to make 
clear that the immunisation activities are supplementary to 
routine immunisation. Routine immunisation should be the 
way that the core immunity of a population is built up over 
time. The supplementation is meant to fill in the gaps that 
routine was missing. 
In reality, in key polio-affected areas of the world, the gaps 
became chasms and the original rationale was forgotten. 
In effect, the supplementary immunisation “cart” was put 
before the routine immunisation “horse.”
This is not only a matter for polio transition planning. 
An immediate and major boost to the quality of routine 
immunisation in the polio reservoirs could be the decisive 
blow to the poliovirus. 
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The Programme’s competence in surveillance
The quality of the system of surveillance in parts of all three 
endemic countries is not consistently high enough to be 
sure that every virus is being detected. The presence of a 
poliovirus that had been circulating undetected in Borno, 
northern Nigeria, for five years illustrates this point; indeed, 
it had the dramatic effect of removing from Nigeria its newly 
minted non-endemic status and dampening the celebratory 
media headlines of a polio-free Africa. 
Whilst, available indicators point to a strong and sensitive 
polio surveillance system across Nigeria, these data are 
potentially misleading. In Borno, incorrect assignment 
of geographic reporting of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) 
cases concealed poor reporting from inaccessible areas. 
It masked gaps in polio surveillance across most of the 
state. The Nigeria programme reportedly collects stools 
from nearly all AFP cases within 14 days and almost 
never reports a case with a missing stool (0.07% in 2016). 
This high level of performance has been observed for 
several years across the majority of Local Government 
Areas. This trend is unprecedented for polio surveillance 
globally, and it is improbable that any system could sustain 
this level for an extended period of time. Added to the 
recent field surveillance reviews that found misreported 
dates of paralysis onset for some AFP cases, these data 
patterns indicate systemic data quality problems in Nigeria. 
Thus, although Nigeria has a large AFP surveillance 
infrastructure, and the largest number of AFP reports 
amongst the endemic countries, there have to be concerns 
about the sensitivity and validity of surveillance in the 
country. 
Nigeria implemented a case verification system in 2015 
and, in 2016, over 16,800 AFP cases were verified. Despite 
the high cost of this system, case verification data are 
of poor quality and not being used to their full potential. 
Furthermore, these data failed to flag inconsistencies and 
potential data manipulation in AFP data identified in recent 
data reviews.  
Whilst it is likely that cases would be quickly detected in 
most parts of Nigeria other than in parts of Borno, the 
IMB does not have full confidence in the current system of 
surveillance in Nigeria. It is imperative to urgently make 
surveillance staff accountable for their actions.
The Borno poliovirus was not the only example of a nasty 
surprise for the Polio Programme. Earlier, in March and 
April 2016, three cases of paralytic polio emerged in the 
Bannu area of Pakistan. The cases occurred over a short 
period of time and were of multiple genetic lineages, 
pointing to a serious immunity gap. The importance of this 
occurrence was that it was largely unexpected. Yet, the 
investigation of the cases, showed that there were multiple 
reasons why this should not have been a surprise.
18
NO MORE  
SURPRISES
Over the last six months, the IMB has heard those in the 
Polio Programme asking each other: “Could there be 
another Borno?” and “Could there be another Bannu?” 
These are the very questions that the Polio Programme 
should be asking itself. However, it is not clear that this 
“upstream” state of mind is widespread. It needs to be. 
Further progress towards eradication will not be made 
unless the Polio Programme fully internalises the lessons 
of Borno and Bannu. This means making maximum use of 
the data that are available, but using them to ask searching 
and self-critical questions. It is an irony that it is such a 
struggle to raise surveillance from its “poor cousin” status 
in relation to immunisation activities when the whole 
world will depend on its veracity in the years running up to 
certification. Closely linked to this is the need for rigorous 
assessment before outbreaks of polio transmission are 
declared over. A major point of the Borno outbreak is that 
you cannot declare that an area is polio free if you don’t 
have access to it.
In Pakistan, acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance 
has improved across all provinces. However, there are 
persistent pockets of poor performance. Environmental 
surveillance has detected wild poliovirus transmission in 
the absence of infected cases of AFP, particularly in Punjab. 
Pakistan needs to further improve AFP surveillance in 
and around known pockets of wild poliovirus transmission 
including in districts that are not in the highest priority 
group. In Afghanistan, AFP surveillance has improved 
over the past few years. Stool adequacy, for surveillance 
purposes, is high and is now better in the Southern region. 
There is good corroboration of isolation of wild poliovirus 
between environmental and AFP surveillance. However, 
a large number of districts in Afghanistan have small 
populations (398 districts with an average under-15 years 
population of 51,000). By definition, they have low expected 
background number of non-polio AFP cases. This means 
that it takes time to understand how well the system is 
performing. Also many districts throughout the country 
have degrees of inaccessibility which require special 
approaches to case detection.
However, because wild poliovirus transmission straddles 
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is high 
likelihood of pockets of weak AFP surveillance despite the 
generally high AFP surveillance performance indicators. 
The findings of surveillance reviews in Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Afghanistan highlight the need for systematic 
improvement in AFP surveillance. National and subnational 
gaps in polio surveillance must be addressed to prepare 
for polio-free certification. The need for systematic 
improvement in AFP surveillance spans beyond the 
three endemic countries. Insecure and inaccessible areas 
limit the comprehensiveness of surveillance systems; 
subpopulations that could sustain transmission might 
not be captured by surveillance systems; country-level 
indicators may mask poor performance at subnational 
levels; and AFP surveillance indicators may be vulnerable 
to data manipulation. 
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Weaknesses in resilience in Nigeria and  
surrounding countries
The IMB is concerned about the situation in Nigeria on a 
number of fronts. Firstly, this generally strong programme 
does not seem to have a full understanding of the status 
of the large populations in areas of inaccessibility in 
northern Nigeria. The size of the population continuing to 
be “trapped” due to insecurity even after military action to 
free communities is not known. IMB sources also report 
that some of the camps for internally displaced people in 
northern Nigeria are in very poor sanitary condition. No 
one can be sure what is going on in this part of Nigeria. It 
is entirely possible that the poliovirus is present or even 
circulating in the camps or within remaining trapped 
populations. There is also a need for a strong focus on the 
15 highest risk Local Government Areas that surround 
Borno. 
Secondly, the Presidential Task Force has only met once 
since 2015 and that was in the run-up to the IMB meeting 
in April 2017 with the Vice-President in the chair. Despite 
many statements of resolve, the IMB is concerned that 
the level of active political commitment and alignment 
from federal, to state, to local level, is not commensurate 
with the ongoing risks of polio re-emerging in the country. 
Furthermore an election is coming in 2019. In the past, 
elections in Nigeria have proved capable of disrupting work 
on polio eradication. 
Thirdly, in parts of southern Nigeria, it seems that 
surveillance officers have not been paid. This means that 
surveillance data from these areas cannot be relied upon. 
It also implies that the importance of surveillance is not 
recognised at the highest level in the country. 
Fourthly, the presence of the circulating poliovirus in 
Borno means that another outbreak could occur in the 
Lake Chad region or in any of the surrounding countries at 
any moment. Other countries are not as well equipped as 
Nigeria to deal with re-established circulation. The same 
quality of pervasive response may not be achieved or 
achievable.
Fifthly, the implications of Borno for other parts of Africa, 
notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo, do not 
appear to have been fully grasped.  There are rumours that 
surveillance efforts, rather than being scaled up in areas 
with limited accessibility, may actually be getting reduced.
The IMB is deeply concerned that there was no early high-
level action to engage the heads of state in the region to 
tell them how poor access and performance actually is, and 
to advise them of the grave danger of polio reintroduction 
in their countries. They should have been told of the 
importance of their personal leadership. It seems that late 
in the day such action is being taken but the IMB was told at 
its meeting, about a letter that had been drafted at WHO but 
“never saw the light of day.”
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The Polio Programme has reached a level of performance 
where there is room for optimism that 2017 will be the 
year when poliovirus transmission globally is permanently 
interrupted. Nigeria has a strong programme that 
pioneered the use of an Emergency Operations Centre 
to integrate a diverse range of partners to drive up the 
level of performance. Pakistan has benefitted from the 
exceptional leadership of the Health Minister and the 
Prime Minister’s Focal Person on Polio Eradication. The 
transformation of the Polio Programme in that country 
from being judged “a disaster” in a previous IMB report is 
quite remarkable. The Afghanistan Programme has done 
well to achieve what it has despite serious problems of 
access due to conflict. 
All this is commendable, but the Polio Programme in the 
three endemic countries and globally is not there yet. The 
optimism must be tempered with a realism about the risks 
and challenges that remain. Only if the appropriate balance 
is struck can the programme succeed soon.
If the narrative and statistical analysis in this IMB Report is 
read carefully, five major priorities for action jump out:
• An innovative and transformational solution must be 
found to vaccinate the large numbers of so-called “Guest 
children” who are within the large high-risk mobile 
population in Pakistan; continuing with the current 
approach will not reduce the numbers of “still missed” 
children from hundreds of thousands to hundreds in less 
than six months.
• A dramatic and immediate turnaround is needed in 
the low level of routine immunisation coverage in 
the polio reservoirs in Pakistan and Afghanistan; the 
current position is a stain on the Programme’s record of 
improved performance.
• The Nigeria Programme has not yet realised that it 
must become an exemplar in how to operate as a high 
resilience enterprise; all its efforts should be directed 
to strengthening the defenses against any poliovirus 
breaking through.
• The whole region around northern Nigeria, Lake Chad 
and surrounding countries has become a red zone 
in which there is a high-risk of the re-emergence of 
circulating poliovirus; leaders at the highest political 
level should be on full alert and completely engaged.
• The quality and integrity of surveillance data across 
the Polio Programme, particularly in northern Nigeria 
and other parts of Africa, which may harbour another 
unwelcome, long-unrecognised outbreak, is not what it 
should be. This is compromising the ability of the Polio 
Programme to be sure that transmission has ended.
These are major problems threatening the successful 
completion of polio eradication. They are problems awaiting 
solutions. The tried and trusted methods that are being 
used are still necessary but matching these problems 
with solutions that bring transformation is the missing 
ingredient. 
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A note on IMB recommendations
This is the 14th report of the IMB. Experience shows 
that the IMB’s value to the programme has come in 
several strands, not purely from its recommendations. In 
particular, it has also come from: the process of national 
and programme leaders preparing for IMB meetings and 
accounting publicly for their records and their actions; 
increased focus being brought to bear on a particularly 
important issue, as a result of IMB observations; the spread 
of best practice between country programs as a result 
of IMB (and other) analyses; and, stimulation of creative 
thought and novel solutions. The recommendations are 
therefore just one part of the IMB process, and should be 
considered alongside the meeting and report, not alone.
Historically, the majority of IMB recommendations have 
been accepted and acted upon to good effect. But this note 
is made because the Polio Programme has sometimes, with 
too little thought, left unaddressed the underlying problem 
prompting a recommendation. Each recommendation in this 
Report is there for an important reason. If it does not hit the 
nail on the head, or is problematic in some way, it should 
not be rejected wholesale. The spirit and intention of that 
recommendation must be understood – through further 
discussion with the IMB as needed – and be acted upon. 
This report describes a series of complex issues, to which 
there are no simple solutions. The IMB is recommending 
important actions that will help but we call on the GPEI 
and the country programmes to “think outside the box” and 
bring powerful ideas, creativity, and ingenuity to the table. 
Recommendations
1. There are concerns about the quality, reliability, 
capacity and authenticity of surveillance data in areas 
across the whole Polio Programme. 
WE RECOMMEND that the reviews of surveillance 
currently being conducted by the GPEI should be 
revisited to ensure that they address: action to 
identify and close surveillance gaps at the national 
and subnational levels; plans for special case 
detection initiatives in all areas of inaccessibility; 
prompt and precise identification of areas (both 
national and subnational) where data quality is 
weak; clear courses of action for identification and 
resolution of data manipulation. A single consolidated 
report reviewing surveillance should be published 
as a matter of urgency. This will make the issues 
much more transparent and mean that the GPEI can 
rapidly improve surveillance in blind spots, including 
through direct outreach to Heads of State. The IMB 
will ask for a special report on polio surveillance at 
its next meeting.
2. The number of children “not available” for vaccination 
in Pakistan whilst away from home elsewhere in the 
union council or district is far too high. 
WE RECOMMEND that the Polio Programme in 
Pakistan should urgently review and enhance local 
microplanning, as well as methods of harvesting 
highly granular local knowledge on individual 
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children’s whereabouts. Experience of the best 
performing local teams should also be distilled. This 
should all be used to create a best practice template 
to match vaccinator visits with the timing of “return 
home” children who were away in the local or district 
environs.
3. The number of so-called “Guest children” regularly 
moving with their families from place to place across 
Pakistan and Afghanistan is huge. The numbers 
amongst them who do not receive the polio vaccine 
even after catch-up immunisation activities is in the 
hundreds of thousands. 
WE RECOMMEND a paradigm shift in approach to 
this population that puts major emphasis on finding 
and vaccinating children in their residential bases, 
no matter how short their stay is. The Pakistan and 
Afghanistan programmes should establish a new 
strategy to address this issue based on integrating 
mobile populations into the whole process of 
microplanning and local programme management, and 
enlisting community leadership in vaccination efforts. 
4. All available sources of data show that the levels of 
routine immunisation in the polio-vulnerable areas 
of Pakistan and Afghanistan are very poor, despite 
substantial investments by Gavi and other groups. 
WE RECOMMEND that a special taskforce be 
assembled to bring about a major transformation in 
performance within the next six months.
5. The NGOs should be more involved in the Polio 
Programme in Afghanistan. The WHO and UNICEF 
largely deliver this as a parallel vertical programme. 
The Afghanistan-based NGOs could be more engaged in 
microplanning and immunisation rounds. 
WE RECOMMEND that a post of NGO Polio Coordinator 
be created in Afghanistan.
6. Conflict in northern Nigeria is driving massive 
population displacement into temporary camps in 
Nigeria or over borders into Niger, Cameroon, or Chad. 
Remaining inaccessibility in Borno, and a serious lack of 
resilience to polio in the largely border-free areas and 
countries surrounding Nigeria, is creating a dangerous 
situation that could easily be concealing polioviruses of 
which the Polio Programme is unaware.
WE RECOMMEND that the global leadership of the 
GPEI strongly engage with the Heads of State of these 
countries to agree a coordinated strategic action plan.
7. The Presidential Task Force on Polio in Nigeria has 
met infrequently over the last few years. It is vital that 
political leadership and coordination is strong if the 
country is going to regain its polio non-endemic status 
ahead of the other two endemic countries. 
WE RECOMMEND that the Presidential Taskforce meet 
on a regular basis, under the chairmanship of Nigeria’s 
Vice-President when the President is not available. 
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8. The determination of when an outbreak of poliovirus is 
closed is currently made within the Polio Programme. 
As the prospect of interrupting global transmission 
grows closer, the validity of judgements about risks of 
ongoing poliovirus circulation become crucial. 
WE RECOMMEND that Regional Certification 
Committees should henceforth formally sign off action 
following an outbreak as satisfactorily completed.
9. In many of our previous reports, we have emphasised 
the importance of social data. Their use is essential 
to enabling the root causes of problems to be fully 
understood and in targeting effective action where 
the behaviour and attitudes of individuals and 
communities is at the heart of delivering a successful 
programme. There has been a noticeable fall off in 
the extent to which social data have been cited in 
discussions between the IMB and the GPEI. 
WE RECOMMEND that the use of social data within 
the Polio Programme is formally reviewed and new 
guidance is formulated and consistently used to 
maximise its value.
10. The Polio Programme has always lacked a way of 
fostering regular opportunities for groups of people to 
come up with innovations in process, in management, 
in communication, and in technology. 
WE RECOMMEND that a system of innovation hubs 
should be established in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
They should seek the input of local people, 
individuals entirely outside the public health field, 
and young people who are not used to working in 
formal organisational structures. They should be 
directed initially to find innovative solutions to the 
problems described in this report.
An IMB source, a very dedicated frontline worker in one of 
the endemic countries, told us: “My job is to make sure that 
as long as the sun shines, and as long as the rivers run, 
poliovirus will never paralyze another child.” We could not 
have put it better. The hunt for every last virus must be 
unrelenting.
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The poliovirus is in core reservoirs
WPV Cases WPV Environmental Samples
Area Low Season 
2016
High Season 
2016
Low Season 
2017
Low Season 
2016
High Season 
2016
Low Season 
2017
Kandahar & Helmand to 
Quetta corridor
4 0 3 3 20 21
Nangarhar & Jalalabad to 
Peshawar Valley corridor
3 0 0 5 5 7
Paktika to South 
Waziristan Corridor
0 9 0 0 0 0
Karachi 1 0 0 8 1 11
Northern Sindh 3 0 0 5 1 1
Other 10 6 3 6 8 8
Total 21 15 6 27 35 48
High season is May to September,  Low season is October to April.  Source: World Health Organization
Inaccessible children
Area Low Season 
2016
High Season 
2016
Low Season 
2017
Kandahar & Helmand to Quetta corridor 14592 32945 33001
Nangarhar & Jalalabad to Peshawar Valley corridor 28543 21422 13343
Paktika to South Waziristan Corridor 6500 18827 29051
Karachi 0 0 0
Northern Sindh 0 0 0
Other 146865 286560 153897
Total 196500 359754 229292
High season is May to September,  Low season is October to April.  Source: World Health Organization
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Missed children even after catch-up Pakistan
Immunisation Round Missed Children
Low Season -2016 767,072
December ’15 110,586
January ‘16 105,615
February ‘16 131,737
March ‘16 123,969
April ‘16 155,834
May ‘16 139,331
High Season -2016 760,219
July ‘16 91,156
August ‘16 165,042
September ‘16 184,518
October ‘16 141,044
November ‘16 178,459
Low Season -2017 858,393
December ‘16 222,652
January ‘17 197,256
February ‘17 214,816
April ‘17 223,669
Total 2,385,684
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Immunisation uptake in polio reservoirs
High Risk Area
Percentage given 
Pentavalent 
vaccine
Percentage given 
Inactivated Polio 
Vaccine
Killa Abdullah 9% 7%
Khyber 26% 22%
Peshawar Zone 1 & 2 61% 57%
Peshawar Zone 3 & 4 55% 52%
Quetta 23% 17%
Pishin 6% 10%
Karachi Zone 1 40% 34%
Karachi Zone 2 59% 50%
Karachi Zone 3 32% 22%
Karachi Zone 4 59% 47%
New detail on “not available” children showing big numbers generally but biggest in those travelling furthest
Children not
available but
elsewhere in
Union Council
104,073 216,466
Children not
available but
elsewhere in
the district
Children not
available and
far away
Low Season 2017
These numbers are indicative of the patterns of movement and unclassifed children have been excluded. Source: World Health Organization
7,304
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Quality of the immunisation response in the Lake Chad region to the discovery of poliovirus in Borno
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Cameroon Niger Nigeria CAR Chad
Im
m
un
is
at
io
n 
ca
m
pa
ig
n 
qu
al
ity
 (L
QA
S%
) 
bOPV 
29
DATA 
INSIGHTS
Improving surveillance in Pakistan – but pockets of poor performance remain
Composite index 2016 – combination of both key 
indicators: ≥2 Non Polio Acute Flaccid Paralysis (NPAFP) 
rate and ≥80% stool adequacy (Adq)
Silent
Missed NPAFP only
Missed Adq only
Missed both
Achieved both
Peshawar
PAKISTAN
PESHAWAR
NOSHKI
Quetta
Karachi ORANGI
KORANGI
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Surveillance quality in Nigeria: many find this hard to believe
Composite index 2016 – combination of both key indicators:
≥3 Non Polio Acute Flaccid Paralysis (NPAFP) rate and
≥80% stool adequacy (Adq)
Silent
Missed NPAFP only
Missed Adq only
Missed both
Achieved both
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Worrying approach to Polio surveillance in Borno, 2016
Accessibility 
0 - 20%
20% - 40%
40% - 60%
60% - 80%
80% - 100%
Nigeria Programme’s 
assignment of AFP cases 
to Local Government Areas
Satellite location of 
AFP cases when seen by 
case verification team
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Current programme +
routine immunisation
Current programme
Polio eradication
Routine immunisation could be a rocket booster in the polio reservoirs
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